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In this paper we explore the bidirectional relationship between intergovernmental 
transfers and regional income inequalities in Uruguay. Based on the construction of a 
simultaneous equations model, that accounts for the joint determination of these two 
variables, and by using a panel of departments (regions) over the period 1990-2012, 
our empirical results show that the central government transfers to regional 
governments does not have a significant impact on regional income inequalities 
levels. In fact, these transfers are strongly determined by the historical validation of 
public expenditure executed by regional governments but not by regional income 
disparities levels. Our results are consistent with the lack of territorial cohesion 
criteria in the normative governing the allocation of these transfers in Uruguay. 
Finally, these results have clear policy implications based on the necessary revision of 
the normative scheme of intergovernmental regional transfers in Uruguay if the 
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In this article we analyze the bidirectional relationship between intergovernmental 
transfers and regional income inequalities in Uruguay over the period 1990-2012. 
The analysis about the relationship between these two variables is an important 
question which has engaged scholars over the years. The intergovernmental transfers 
are an important tool for territorial cohesion in developed countries where territorial 
inequities are also considered when these countries design the normative scheme of 
their regional transfers. The European Union model of territorial cohesion, by using a 
range of fiscal instruments, is a clear example of this (Böheme 2009 and Böheme et 
al. 2011). However, a regional transfers scheme that does not provide in a clear and 
explicit way a territorial convergence normative criteria, probably do not contribute to 
the territorial convergence and even more, it could  reinforce the existing disparities 
(Martinez-Vazquez and Sepulveda 2011; Alm and Martinez-Vazquez 2015). 
Although in recent years the majority of Latin American Countries (LAC) have 
implemented major reforms of their public finances at regional level1, are virtually 
non-existent those countries that have implemented successful systems of 
intergovernmental transfers that explicitly pursue the objective of territorial cohesion. 
Most of these countries have implemented revenuesharing systems which have 
serious design problems since simultaneously pursue multiple objectives, for example, 
efficiency and national standards of utility and equity. These systems have been also 
subjected to high levels of volatility of the revenues levels of sub-national 
governments by introducing disincentives in the collection of own resources and 
                                                          
1
  For a detailed analysis of these reforms see Brosio and Jiménez (2012). 
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ignoring the differences between sub-central governments' fiscal capacity and 
expenditure needs (Martinez-Vazquez and Sepulveda, 20l2). 
In a fiscal centralized country like Uruguay, becomes really important to analyze the 
role of intergovernmental transfers as one of the most important fiscal tools for 
regional convergence. These transfers represent an important percentage of 
Uruguayan regional governments (RGs) revenues and their relative importance has 
been increasing in recent decades (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1 - Regional Governments revenues, by type (1990 - 2012) 
In percentage of total Regional Governments revenues 
 
Source: Office of Planning and Budget - Presidency of the Republic 
 
Moreover, even being a small country, Uruguay shows important differences in terms 
of per capita income levels between regions2. The figure 2 shows this situation 
considering the relationship between households per capita income of each department 
                                                          
2 Uruguay is divided in 19 departments which are the second level of government, after Central 











1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Own revenues Intergovermental transfers
 4 
(region) in relation with Montevideo (the most populous and richest department of the 
country) for the years 1990, 2000 and 2012. 
 
Figure 2 – Relationship between household’s per capita income of each department and the mean 
value of Montevideo, for selected years 
 
                1990                     2000                   2012 
          
                                                                                        
 Hasta 50% de Montevideo 
 Entre 51% y 60% de Montevideo 
 Entre 61% y 70% de Montevideo 
 71% y más de Montevideo 
Source: Continuous Household Survey of the National Institute of Statistics of Uruguay 
 
An important feature is the enormous importance (or weight) of Montevideo (the 
capital) in the national economy. Over the period 1990 to 2012, household’s per capita 
income of Montevideo, according to data from the Continuous Household Survey of 
the National Institute of Statistics of Uruguay, is between 120% or 130% of the 
national average income per capita. In turn, the situation between the other 
departments of the country is not homogeneous. In particular, we can observe lower 
relative incomes of the departments in the north and northeast of the country, while 
the departments of the south coast (from Colonia to Maldonado) show higher relative 
incomes. 
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During the last two decades have occurred five national administrations and the same 
number of regional authorities in Uruguay, with alternation of political parties that 
rule both at central and at regional levels3. In this context, the analyzed period (1990 - 
2012) enables us to identify regularities and structural relationships between 
intergovernmental transfers and regional income inequalities.  
Considering this context, we propose to reconsider the relationship between regional 
inequalities and intergovernmental transfers based on a panel of departments (regions) 
of Uruguay over the period 1990 to 2012 and by way of estimation techniques which 
deal head on with the potential interdependencies. Specifically, we consider a 
simultaneous equation model which accounts for the joint determination of these 
relevant endogenous variables. This approach allows us to obtain more appropriate 
estimates of the relevant parameters and, ultimately, helps us identify the causal 
relationships between the two variables that we focus on.  
Our empirical results show that the central government transfers to regional 
governments does not have a significant impact on regional income inequalities levels. 
In fact, our estimates support the idea that regional inequalities have a significant and 
negative impact on intergovernmental transfers. That is, the richest is one department 
the more per capita intergovernmental transfers he receives. The intergovernmental 
transfers also are positively determined by the historical public expenditure executed 
by regional governments and negatively affected by the population size of the 
departments. The RGs size exemplifies the importance of fiscal needs of these 
regional governments. While the positive effect of departments’ population might be 
driven in response to the perceived presence of scale economies in the delivery of sub-
                                                          
3 The political parties that have alternated in the central and regional governments are: Partido 
Colorado, Partido Nacional and Encuentro Progresista-Frente Amplio. For a more detailed analysis of 
economic aspects of these governments, see Amarante et al (2011). 
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national public services or due to the potentially disproportionate lobbying power of 
smaller sub national jurisdictions. Specially, these empirical results are consistent with 
the lack of territorial cohesion criteria established in clear and priority basis in current 
normative in Uruguay. Given this context, our analysis has clear policy implications 
based on the necessary revision of regional transfer’s regulatory scheme in Uruguay if 
the objective is to arrive at a country with a higher degree of territorial cohesion. 
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the contributions that have 
explored how the design and implementation of sub-national finances could affect 
regional inequalities and how regional inequalities levels could affect the allocation of 
these sub-national finances. Section 3 performs an analysis of current normative and 
administration of regional public finances in Uruguay. Section 4 describes how we 
measure our key endogenous variables. Section 5 details the empirical methodology 
applied. Then, in section 6 we present our empirical findings and some robustness 
analysis. Finally, section 7 details the conclusions and some policy implications. 
 
2. Sub-national finances and regional inequalities in the economic 
literature 
 
In an effort to elucidate the causal channels linking regional inequalities’ and sub-
national finances we review the economic literature that has analyzed their 
bidirectional relationship. 
2.1 The determinants of intergovernmental transfers 
Several studies have analyzed the scheme that governs the design of regional 
intergovernmental transfers. Mainly three strands of literature consider different 
factors that may affect the distribution of these regional intergovernmental transfers 
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(Boex and Martinez-Vazquez, 2005). Firstly, the public finance literature provides a 
normative guidance on how intergovernmental grants should be distributed in order to 
improve the efficient and specifically the equitable allocation of resources in a country 
(Musgrave, 1959; Oates, 1972). In pursuit efficiency objective, the intergovernmental 
transfer’s scheme seeks to correct for under-provision of certain local public services. 
Since not all the benefits from the provision of certain public services accrue to the 
local government level, local governments would tend to under-provide certain local 
public services (for example, education). As a result, in the presence of positive 
externalities in the delivery of local services, the normative pursuit of economic 
efficiency would result in the central government providing greater intergovernmental 
transfers in response to higher local expenditure needs (for example, as reflected by 
the number of school-aged children). The second normative economic objective, 
which is of the special interest in the present study, is to achieve a more equitable 
distribution of resources across the population. In this sense, policies that assure 
equitable access to public services is often pursued through equalizing 
intergovernmental transfers schemes.  
Secondly, political economy arguments could also contribute to explaining how 
governments determine the intergovernmental transfers. Some public choice models 
argue that political decision-making processes can be “captured” by powerful interest 
groups, so that the distribution of public resources across local government units 
would be at least partially determined by political and institutional factors (Raimondo 
1983; Grossman 1994; Atlas et al. 1995). An implication of this literature is that sub-
national governments with powerful political interests can be expected to receive 
larger intergovernmental transfers. For example, local jurisdictions that have 
disproportionately greater representation on a per capita basis (e.g., regions that have 
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more legislators per capita) might be expected to attract more intergovernmental 
transfers on a per capita basis. Also, theoretically, elected officials with smaller 
constituencies have a greater incentive (and opportunity) to lobby for greater 
intergovernmental resources, as the pay-off per vote is greater (Weingast 1979; Atlas 
et al. 1995; Porto and Sanguinetti 2001). This strand of political economy literature 
also arguments that jurisdictions which are represented at the national level by senior 
lawmakers or government officials might wield their influence to bias the transfer 
mechanism in favor of their home districts. Likewise, local governments that are able 
to exert greater political pressure on the center may receive greater political benefits in 
the form of greater transfers. For instance, sub-national governments that have greater 
resources to exert political pressure on the central government (for instance, by 
financially supporting political candidates) may be able to convince the central 
government to engage in counter-equalizing intergovernmental grants. A final 
political economy argument centers on the size of jurisdictions. Pereira (1996) argues 
that smaller local governments might receive greater intergovernmental transfers on a 
per capita basis as a result of the mechanism used for local government lobbying 
activities. Independent of the impact of potential scale economies, and independent of 
the national electoral system, smaller jurisdictions might be able to increase their 
relative share of intergovernmental transfers if local government lobbying 
organizations are based on the “one mayor, one vote” principle. For instance, if each 
mayor has one vote in the policy recommendations of the national association of local 
governments, then the association’s common position will tend to be biased in favor 
of smaller jurisdictions.  
Thirdly, a growing body of political economy literature has been centered on how 
incumbents use intergovernmental transfers for strategic purposes. The central idea of 
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this approach is that political parties and candidates use redistributive policies as an 
instrument in order to maximize their electoral results, aside from other normative or 
efficiency considerations. This argument involves two assumptions. First, it assumes 
that politicians are mainly self-interested rent-seekers and they principally care about 
(re)-election. Second, it assumes that voters are mainly interested in the private 
consumption derived from public policies investment. Based on those premises, the 
literature has investigated the political determinants driving this strategic use of 
transfers. In this sense, scholars mainly points problems caused by the central 
government authorities that discriminate in the allocation of intergovernmental 
transfers between local governments politically aligned and non-aligned which could 
result in not desired effects on territorial cohesion. Various analytical models argue 
that the intergovernmental transfers are distributed between regions for the purpose of 
winning votes or elections in the future. These models can be divided into two main 
groups: "models of swing voters" and "models of core supporters". The strategy of 
allocating more transfers to regions with a high proportion of undecided voters is 
based on the assumption that these marginal transfers could affect the decision of 
which party voters choose (Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987; Dixit and Londregan, 1995, 
1996). In these models, voter turnout is fixed, so the electoral competition is driven by 
the efforts of "conversion" rather than "mobilizing". Meanwhile, loyal voters models 
are based on assumptions derived from Cox and McCubbins (1986) which states that, 
if politicians are risk averse, funds will be allocated in regions where voters are clearly 
aligned with the government political party (“core supporters”). Several empirical 
studies have tested these hypotheses finding significant effects of political alignment, 
for example, Grossman (1994) and Levitt and Snyder (1995) for the United States, 
Worthington and Dollery (1998) for Australia, Khemani (2003) and Dasgupta et al 
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(2004 ) for India, Diaz-Cayeros et al (2007) for Mexico, Sole-Ollé and Sorribas 
(2008) for Spain, and Brollo and Nannicini (2012) for Brazil. 
 
2.2 The regional effects of sub-national finances 
The economic literature also has analyzed the effects of different sub-national fiscal 
instruments on regional inequalities. Firstly, intergovernmental transfers can foster 
spending on public services that create spillovers effects to the local economy, 
reducing the use of inefficient local taxes (Dahlby and Wilson, 1994), or ensure the 
access to essential public goods throughout all the economy (Buchanan, 1950). In 
turn, intergovernmental transfers to poorer regions, have the potential to foster local 
production reducing regional inequalities (Limoneiro, 2015). Related with prior 
argument, the effect of these transfers in reducing income inequalities can occur 
within regions which could generate a feedback effect between equality and growth 
inside these regions, contributing to the reduction of inequalities between regions 
(Betson and Haveman, 1984). However, several studies argue that when the design of 
intergovernmental transfers system is assigned to a wide range of responsibilities or 
pursue conflicting objectives, it fails to achieve its goals, especially in reducing 
regional inequalities (Martinez-Vazquez and Sepulveda 2011; Alm and Martinez-
Vazquez 2015). Secondly, another important factor that may explain the reduction of 
regional inequalities could be the degree of fiscal autonomy of regional governments. 
There are several reasons why of fiscal decentralization may reduce regional 
inequalities. On the one hand, regional governments have more and better information 
about the needs of their constituents and therefore find it easier to adjust their policies 
to local preferences (Oates, 1972). This should lead to more effective policies in order 
to promote regional economic development (Oates, 1993). On the other hand, fiscal 
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decentralization can promote inter-jurisdictional competition for scarce fiscal 
resources, which could generate a penalties system for inefficient local governments 
and, consequently, promote regional convergence (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980; 
Weingast, 1995; McKinnon, 1997; Qian and Weingast, 1997). Voters can use as a 
benchmark the results obtained by governments of each jurisdiction and this can lead 
to greater efficiency in the provision of local public goods (Salmon, 1987; Breton, 
1996). However, there are studies that argue that increasing regional fiscal autonomy 
could increase regional inequalities. Because fiscal decentralization means taking 
resources away from the central government, it can weaken the scope of the 
intergovernmental regional transfers (Prud'homme, 1995). Moreover, decentralization 
can increase the ability to reduce net outflows of resources by sub-national 
governments of the richest regions, limiting redistributive policies of the central 
government (Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2010). Related with this, in highly 
decentralized countries where the potential for redistribution by the central 
government are limited, the richest and greater regions may finance local public goods 
at lower tax rates, which also help to consolidate or increase regional inequalities 
(Prud'homme, 1995; Keen and Marchand, 1997; Oates, 1999).  
 
3. Regional public finances: the Uruguayan case  
The fiscal revenues of RGs in Uruguay can be classified in two main categories: 
 Own resources: local taxes4 or taxes fixed by the Central Government 
but collected by RGs. 
 Intergovernmental transfers. 
                                                          
4
 The main ones are the property tax on urban and suburban real assets and vehicle taxes. 
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Although, from the constitutional reform of 1996, the country has begun to implement 
an incipient process of decentralization or greater fiscal autonomy of the RGs, 
Uruguay is a fiscal centralized country. Nearly the 90% of national public expenditure 
over the period 1990 - 2012, was directly executed by Central Government, while 
RGs are responsible for only 10% of the execution of these public spending5. In fact, 
the powers formally assigned to the RGs, the second level of government, are defined 
in the Basic Law of Governance and Administration of the Departments (No. 9.515) 
that remains unchanged since 1935.  
The traditional competences of the RGs are public services that could be compared 
with those assigned to a third level of government in other Latin America countries 
(BID 2007). These activities mainly are: the investment and maintenance of urban 
equipment, road maintenance, traffic organization, public transport, cleaning, public 
lighting, cemetery services, and health control and land management issues. 
Additionally, since 1985, with the return of democracy, the public services provided 
by RGs have been expanded. Thus, now they are involved in activities related with the 
promotion of social and economic development (see Rodríguez Miranda 2014, and 
Arocena 2008). In turn, since the constitutional reform of 1996, RGs have gained 
greater opportunities to expand its fiscal autonomy. However, these opportunities have 
not been exploited. The RGs have followed traditional and centralist logic for demand 
more resources from the central government in order to address their activities (BID 
2007 and 2009). Thus, the RGs avoid the political costs of implement new and/or 
higher local taxes (Arocena, 2008).  Moreover, various modifications reflected in the 
1996s constitutional reform are decentralization measures with a general and 
                                                          
5
 For a detail of the composition and importance of RGs revenues see tables A.5 and 4.6 in the 
Appendix. 
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indeterminate nature, since failed to build a strong agreement that favors greater 
decentralization of powers and resources for RGs (CEDES, 2010).  
As a result of the above processes, the RGs have tended to "pressure" the central 
government for the purposes of achieving to higher level of intergovernmental 
transfers in order to finance their traditional and non-traditional policies. 
The intergovernmental transfers in Uruguay are defined in the National Budget Law, 
in each five-year period of government. However, during these government periods 
are emerging laws that add complementary items into intergovernmental transfers. In 
many cases justified by exceptional issues (e.g. financial crisis, drought) but in most 
cases, they end up consolidating as permanent items (Rodríguez-Miranda, 2014). 
During the nineties, in National Budget Laws (1991-1995 and 1996-2000), the main 
items of intergovernmental transfers were determined by negotiation between the 
central government and each RG separately. From the 2001 the changes established in 
the constitutional reform of 1996 were incorporated. The Article 214 provides, in each 
five-year period, an aliquot of the total national budget to be distributed between the 
RGs. With the setting of a fixed annual percentage of the national budget was tried to 
avoid the logic of negotiations and pay the transfer scheme only once in the national 
budget. However, it is important to point out that central government has continued 
giving extra items outside the scope of the National Budget Law. In fact, this 
negotiation between the central government and each RG separately has given priority 
to expenditure needs of the RGs and their capacity for political pressure (lobbying) in 
order to access to more resources (Rodríguez-Miranda, 2014). The other constitutional 
article governing unconditional transfers is the number 298 (Development Fund of the 
Interior FDI), which is also defined in the National Budget Law. However, only the 
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33.5% of FDI goes directly to the RGs and the remaining 66.5% is also controlled by 
the Central Government. 
In this sense, we could say that the presence of a formula-based allocation mechanism 
in itself does not assure that the allocation of resources is objective, fair, efficient or 
stable in Uruguay. In this country, the central government has the discretion to 
unilaterally change most of the factors included in the allocation formula and change 
their relative weights from year to year, giving the central government de facto control 
to alter the effective distribution intergovernmental transfers’. In general terms, it 
could be said that the normative scheme of intergovernmental transfers in Uruguay 
defines an aliquot of each RG in every five in the National Budget Law, resulting in 
percentages that reflect the capabilities of political negotiation and historical 
trajectories respect how much each RG have received, without reflecting relevant 
criteria of territorial cohesion. The regional distribution of resources does not 
exemplify a clear and pre-established mechanism for calculating these percentages. In 
fact, it is widely recognized among fiscal policy experts and practitioners that ad hoc 
intergovernmental transfers which are determined annually or local government 
allocations that are negotiated as part of the central government budget formulation 
process are inherently more centralizing than formula-based grants (Bahl 1999). 
 
4. Data: endogenous variables 
In this section we review the indicators employed to measure regional inequalities and 
intergovernmental regional transfers. We construct an unbalanced panel of 18 
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departments over the period 1990 to 2012, basing our selection on the availability, 
frequency and quality of the data6. 
In order to measure regional inequalities (RI), we construct an approach to a measure 
commonly used in the literature focused on regional analysis7. More specifically, we 
use a distance measure or coefficient of variation ( tiCV , ) from a reference value or 
benchmark, which is the Montevideo department (the department with the highest per 
capita income over the whole period)8. In this context, the regional inequalities 
indicator takes de following form: 
 
   
                          














                       (1)
 
 
where  tMTVy ,
 
is the average per capita income of Montevideo at the moment t, while 
ity  is the average per capita income of department i at time t. The CV index basically 
reflects inequalities between regions in Uruguay. It ranges between 0 (equality) and 1 
(maximum inequalities).  
Finally, the intergovernmental transfer index is measured as RG revenues that 
originate in transfers received from the central government expressed in per capíta 
terms (for similar indexes see, for example, Boex 2003, Brodjonegoro and Martinez-
Vazquez 2004, Sollé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro 2008). 
                                                          
6
 See Appendix Table A.2 for a list of departments including, Table A.3 for variables definitions and 
data sources and Table A.4 for summary statistics. 
7
 See Williamson (1965), Ezcurra and Pascual (2008), Lessmann (2009), and Rodríguez-Pose and 
Ezcurra (2010).  
8
 The selection of Montevideo as a reference value, in addition to considering its position as the richest 
region of the country, consider also that this RG began to receive transfers from the central government 
since 2006 (being their income, up to that year, 100% from own resources).  
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5. Empirical methodology 
 
Given the potential interdependence between our key variables, it is necessary to 
apply an empirical method that considers their mutual influence in order to avoid 
severe specification errors. Consequently we propose to estimate a full system for the 
joint determination of these relevant endogenous variables. Specifically, we propose 
to estimate a simultaneous equation model (SEM) which consists of a series of two 
equations describing regional inequalities and central government transfers. The 
proposed model takes the following form: 
 
                          itititit
uXTRRI
,1,12,110  
                                    (3) 
             itititit
uYRITR
,2,22,210                                   (4) 
 
where itRI , and itTR refer to our dependent variables of regional inequalities and 
central government transfers, respectively. In turn, 18,...,1i  refer to regional 
governments, Tt ,...,1
 
to years, ( 00 , ) are constant terms, ( 11, ) are the 
coefficients associated to the endogenous variables, ( 22 , ) are the coefficient 
vectors associated to the explanatory or control variables X1,it, and Y2,it  respectively, 
while itnu ,  (n = 1, 2)  refers to the error terms for each of the two equations of the 
SEM model. 
We estimate our model with annual data and; additionally, three-year averages of all 
variables have been considered. By taking three-year averages will reduce the short-
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run fluctuations and therefore the influence of the economic cycle, thus permitting a 
focus on the structural relationships.  
Finally, in order to exploit efficiency gains from the correlation of error terms cross 
equation, the full set of equations of the SEM jointly estimated trough full information 
methods. This methods thus deals explicitly with the a-priori interdependence between 
regional inequalities and central government transfers, as such, allows us to obtain 
more appropriate estimates of the relevant parameters. Moreover, we assume that the 
disturbances from the different regression equations at a given point in time are 
correlated, because of common unobservable factors. In order to exploit efficiency 
gains from the correlation of error terms across equations and the mutual influence of 
the relevant endogenous variables, the full set of three equations of the SEM will be 
jointly estimated using system instrumental variables methods (SIV)9. More 
specifically, we use two methods of estimation. Firstly, the SEM model is estimated 
using three-stage least squares (3SLS) accounting for heteroskedasticity and 
contemporaneous correlation of the errors across equations. The 3SLS is an IV-GLS 
estimator which achieves consistency through instrumentation and efficiency through 
appropriate weighting10. However, because the modern approach to SIV methods is 
based on the principle of the generalized method of moments (GMM)11, the SEM 
model is also estimated by way of GMM estimators. Specifically, we consider a (two-
step) three-stage least squares GMM estimator (3SLS-GMM) with an unadjusted 
                                                          
9
 See Wooldridge (2010) for a good explanation of these SIV methods. And, see Greene (2012), 
Kmenta (1997) and Zellner and Theil (1962) for references on system estimation methodology. Avery 
(1977) and Baltagi (1981, 2008) discuss applications of these methodologies to panel data models. 
10
 See Zellner and Theil (1962), Kmenta (1997) and Greene (2003; pp. 405-407) for references on 
3SLS estimation methodology. However, see Avery (1977) and Baltagi (1981 and 2008; chapter 7) for 
applications of 3SLS to an error components model. 
11
 The GMM estimator is discussed in all the leading textbooks, including Cameron and Trivedi (2005 
and 2010), Davidson and MacKinnon (2004), Hayashi (2000), and Wooldridge (2010). The collection 
of papers by Matyas (1999) provides both theoretical and applied aspects of GMM. 
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weight matrix12. It is important to mention that an important feature of GMM 
estimation is that by selecting different weight matrices, we can obtain estimators that 
also can tolerate heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation, and other features of the error 
terms. Compared to a single-equation approach, these two system estimation methods 
are able to spell out feed-back simultaneities among the key endogenous variables, 
and as a result obtain consistent and more efficient estimates. Moreover, these two 
estimation methods are appropriate when some of the control variables are 
endogenous (see Wooldridge 2010). In this case, and in the presence of significant 
within variability, we employ lags of the potential endogenous control variables as 
instruments (see, most notably Barro 2000) 13.  
In every equation, the number of exclusions is sufficient for the order condition of the 
identification to be satisfied. More specifically, each equation of the system is 
identified given that at least one control variables actually appear in the other equation 
but not in the reference equation (see Wooldridge 2010, Theorem 9.1). In turn, the 
rank condition of every equation of the system (3) to (4) can be safely assumed to hold 
in a model of this size14. The selection of the control variables included in each 
regression of the system is guided by the need to reduce omitted variable bias. Thus, 
there is the a-priori expectation that the control variables may be related to the two 
key variables we scrutinize in this article.  
  
                                                          
12
 The 3SLS-GMM estimator is a two-step GMM estimator. In the ﬁrst step, we do the equivalent of 
2SLS on each equation, and then we compute a weight matrix based on the matrix of moment 
conditions. In this context, the two step 3sls-gmm estimation obtains parameter estimates based on the 
initial weight matrix, computes a new weight matrix based on those estimates, and then reestimates the 
parameters based on that weight matrix (see Hayashi 2000, Chapter 4).  
13
 In fact, we employ lagged values as instruments for the following control variables: region GDP per 
capita, region population and regional government expenditure per capita. All the control variables 
employed are fully discussed below.  
14
 For a complete exposition of the identification of equation systems, see Greene (2012), Bjorn and 
Krishnakumar (2008) or Theil (1971).  
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The control variables15 
The set of control variables for each equation in the systems is based on prior 
specifications of regional inequalities16 and government transfers equations17, and also 
considering the availability, frequency and quality of the data sources.  
In transfers’ equation, we consider that the per capita amount of intergovernmental 
transfers received by RGs is mainly determined by four factors: an approximation to 
local expenditure needs, a measure of RGs revenue capacity, a measure of political 
factors, and the population size of different departments (regions) of Uruguay.  
Since RGs in Uruguay basically provide municipal services (see section 3) we cannot 
use the age distribution of regional population in order to approximate education, 
health and social security services. These services are the responsibility of central 
government. As a result, we choose to work with the lagged vale of the expenditures 
of RGs in order to approach fiscal needs but also the negotiating capacity of these 
RGs. In order to take into account richness of the departments and their local revenue 
capacity, we always control for GDP per capita of the department. The sign of this 
variable is conceptually indeterminate. If equity concerns are dominant in the 
allocation of intergovernmental transfers (Grossman 1994), then we should find a 
negative sign. However, if sub-national wealth is predominantly a reflection of 
political power, the sign might be expected to be positive. Also, according to the 
political economy literature, a positive relationship should be expected between 
political factors, such as political alignment between central government and RGs, and 
                                                          
15
 The Table A.3 in the Appendix provides the deﬁnitions and sources of all variables 
16
 See, for example, Ezcurra and Pascual (2008), Lessman (2009), Ezcurra and Rodríguez-Pose (2014), 
and Kyriacou et al. (2015). 
17
 See, for example, Alm and Boex (2001), Porto and Sanguinetti (2001), Boex (2003), Brodjonegoro 
and Martinez-Vazquez (2004), Sollé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro (2008), Curto-Grau, Solé-Ollé and 
Sorribas-Navarro (2012) 
 20 
size of intergovernmental transfers. In this sense, we have included a dummy variable 
that tries to capture the political alignment criteria in the allocation of 
intergovernmental transfers. Finally, we also include as control variable, the 
population size of different departments of Uruguay. The expected sign of this 
variable is negative (smaller departments receive greater per capita transfers), which 
may be caused either by scale economies or due to the potentially disproportionate 
lobbying power of smaller sub national jurisdictions. 
In regional inequalities equation, we consider a variable that measure the degree of 
regional autonomy or fiscal decentralization in Uruguay. Since, by law, the RGs in 
Uruguay must meet exactly the same functions, we think that RG own revenues per 
capita are a well indicator of fiscal decentralization. Based on historical evidence also 
we control by a categorical variable that measure the potential for regional 
development in Uruguay. More specifically, this variable groups the Uruguayan 
departments in three main regions (Rodríguez-Miranda 2006 and 2014; Barrenechea 
and Troncoso 2008). The indicator is a categorical variable that takes values 0, 1 and 
2. The value 0 is assigned to departments that show a low potential for regional 
development, in practical terms is defined as persistently departments that in the 
period 1990-2012 are shown worst positioned relative to national average GDP per 
capita. A value of 1 is assigned to departments that hold intermediate positions in the 
national context. The value 2 is assigned to departments that persistently show the best 
indicators in the national context and, therefore, are at the top of the ranking between 
departments18. Also, in inequalities equations we consider an indicator of regional 
assets inequality measured by the Gini index of the average years of education of the 
                                                          
18
 The RGs with value 2 are: Canelones, Maldonado, Colonia and San José. With value 1 are: 
Paysandú, Lavalleja, Salto, Río Negro, Soriano, Rocha, Florida and Flores. Finally, with value 0 are: 
Treinta y Tres, Rivera, Tacuarembó, Artigas, Durazno and Cerro Largo.  
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population of each department. An indicator that measures the distance in kilometres 
to Montevideo (city port and the greater domestic consumption market) which seeks 
to gather the argument of the New Economic Geography which postulates the 
economies of agglomeration as a factor of territorial inequality. And, finally, we 
consider two indicators of department economic activity: the unemployment rate and 
the activity rate. 
 
6. Results  
We report our empirical findings in tables 1 and 2. The former employs annual data 
while the latter uses three year averages. The large difference in the number of 
observations in each case means that table 2 can be seen as a robustness check of the 
results based on annual data. Moreover, using three year averages helps us to focus on 
the structural relationships since it tends to reduce short-run fluctuations due to the 
business cycle (see also, Lessmann 2009 and 2012; Muinelo-Gallo and Rodriguez 
Miranda 2014; and Kyriacou et al. 2015). 
To facilitate the interpretation of the results we will discuss them in the context of 
different estimated models. Always we report our results considering 3SLS and 3SLS-
GMM estimators. Firstly, we report the estimations of the base model (columns 1 to 
4), the columns 1 and 2 report the base model with regional inequalities indicator (CV 
index), while the columns 3 and 4 consider the log of the departments’ GDP per 
capita. Both collinear variables measure the regional equalizer criteria of the central 
government when allocate regional transfers. Secondly, as additional robustness 
check, we report our estimations considering additional control variables (columns 5 
to 8). We re-estimate our models, replacing the categorical regional variable for its 
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fundaments. More specifically, we substitute this regional index by the Gini index of 
the average years of education of the population of each department. An indicator that 
measures the distance in kilometres to Montevideo and finally, two indicators of 
department economic activity: the unemployment rate and the activity rate. 
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Table 1 SEM model - Regressions results (Annual) 
 
Base model More control variables 
CV Index Log of GDP per capita CV Index Log of GDP per capita 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
3SLS 3SLS-GMM 3SLS 3SLS-GMM 3SLS 3SLS-GMM 3SLS 3SLS-GMM 
Eq 1: RI Eq2: TR Eq 1: RI Eq2: TR Eq 1: RI Eq2: TR Eq 1: RI Eq2: TR Eq 1: RI Eq2: TR Eq 1: RI Eq2: TR Eq 1: RI Eq2: TR Eq 1: RI Eq2: TR 
Regional inequalities (RI)  -0.632* (0.423)  
-0.966*** 




(0.187)  --  
-- 
 















Log of Region GDP pc  --  --  0.492*** (0.057)  
0.511*** 



































Log of Regional government 



























































(0.006)  --  --  --  --  







Temporal effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.517 0.771 -- -- 0.516 0.800 -- -- 0.656 0.769 -- -- 0.657 0.800 -- -- 
J-test -- -- 0.0000 0.0000 -- -- 0.0000 0.0000 -- -- 0.0000 0.0000 -- -- 0.0000 0.0000 
Observations 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. J-test: Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions indicating the validity of the 





Table 2 SEM model - Regressions results (3 year means) 
 
Base model More control variables 
CV Index Log of GDP per capita CV Index Log of GDP per capita 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
3SLS 3SLS-GMM 3SLS 3SLS-GMM 3SLS 3SLS-GMM 3SLS 3SLS-GMM 
Eq 1: RI Eq2: TR Eq 1: RI Eq2: TR Eq 1: RI Eq2: TR Eq 1: RI Eq2: TR Eq 1: RI Eq2: TR Eq 1: RI Eq2: TR Eq 1: RI Eq2: TR Eq 1: RI Eq2: TR 
Regional inequalities (RI)  -0.225* (0.198)  
-1.430*** 




(0.344)  --  
-- 
 















Log of Region GDP pc  --  --  0.500*** (0.075)  
0.347*** 



































Log of Regional government 



























































(0.009)  --  --  --  --  







Temporal effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.627 0.934 -- -- 0.627 0.934 -- -- 0.755 0.934 -- -- 0.755 0.934 -- -- 
J-test -- -- 0.0000 0.0000 -- -- 0.0000 0.0000 -- -- 0.0000 0.0000 -- -- 0.0000 0.0000 
Observations 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. J-test: Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions indicating the validity of the 





Beginning with the relationship between intergovernmental transfers and regional 
inequalities, our estimates support the idea that regional inequalities have a significant 
and negative impact on transfers. That is, the greater is the distance of one department 
to the mean value of per capita income of the richest department of the country 
(Montevideo) less per capita transfers this department receives. This result also is 
reflected by the fact that there is a positive and significant effect of the GDP per capita 
of the department on intergovernmental transfers. Remember that GDP pc also accounts 
for the impact of local revenue capacity on intergovernmental transfers but mainly this 
sub-national wealth could be a reflection of political power of richest departments of the 
country. Furthermore, we did not find a significant impact of transfers on regional 
inequalities. These transfers do not to have a regional equalizer effect in Uruguay. 
Finally, regardless of the indicators employed or the additional controls included in the 
regressions, our results are maintained.  
In relation with control variables in central government transfers equations, we always 
observe a positive and significant impact of lagged regional government size (regional 
government expenditure over region GDP). That is, on average, the more RGs spends 
the more transfers are obtained; this is maintained when tri-annual averages data, 
namely that the RGs expenditures of the last three years has a positive impact on present 
intergovernmental transfers received. This result could reflect the impact of RGs fiscal 
needs but also the negotiating capacity of these RGs when demands resources to the 
central government through regional transfers. Also the department’s population size is 
significant and positively related with transfer’s allocation. On average, a larger 
population of one department, the greater the intergovernmental transfers he received. 
The observed relationship might be driven in response to the perceived presence of 
scale economies in the delivery of sub-national public services, which could prompt 
 26 
policy makers to include an equal shares component into the allocation formula. 
Alternatively, the fiscal bias in favor of smaller (less populous) sub-national 
governments may be driven by political motivations, either to secure broad political 
support from the sub-national government tier (including less populous rural areas) in 
the vertical power structure, or to secure the political support of sub-national 
representatives (for instance, senators) at the national level. Finally, with regard to the 
political alignment variable we never obtain a significant effect of this variable. 
Therefore, with regard to the determination of the intergovernmental transfers cannot be 
said that there is logic of award and punishment to RGs aligned and non-aligned 
politically with the political party in the central government. 
In relation with control variables of regional inequalities equations, we observe a 
significant and negative impact of fiscal decentralization indicator (see Muinelo-Gallo 
and Rodriguez-Miranda 2014). Lastly, we observe a significant and negative impact of 
our indicator of regional development. So the greatest develop potential is the minor 
regional inequalities are. In turn, when we replace this indicator by different variables 
that might explain its composition (columns 5 to 8 of tables 1 and 2) we get the 
expected significance and sign of each of these new variables included. In this sense, the 
regional development variable is mainly explained by unequal assets index (education 
Gini index), the distance from the capital (as the argument of economies of 







In this article we have analyzed the bidirectional relationship between 
intergovernmental transfers and regional inequalities in Uruguay. Our main results 
points that intergovernmental transfers do not play a significant role to reduce regional 
income inequalities in Uruguay. In turn, richer departments in Uruguay receive more 
per capita intergovernmental transfers than poorer departments. The distribution of 
these resources is also explained by the size of the regions (population) and by the 
historical size of the RGs.  
This empirical evidence is consistent with the lack of territorial cohesion criteria 
established in clear and priority way in current normative in Uruguay. Although we can 
observe the presence of objective formula-based of intergovernmental transfers system, 
the final allocation and incidence of these transfers is not according to what is stated in 
the formula because there are other intervening factors. Furthermore, the 
intergovernmental transfer’s mechanism itself is often on ad hoc basis. In fact, the 
allocation of intergovernmental transfers on an ad hoc basis provides public officials 
and politicians with an opportunity to wield their influence to the benefit of their 
constituents.   
Also, it’s really important to mention that most of the RGs in Uruguay exhibit, 
increasingly higher dependence on intergovernmental transfers. In this context, the 
actual scheme of political negotiations between the central government and RGs could 
be perverse because it would seem that induce developing rent seeking capabilities via 
intergovernmental transfers, rather than generate genuine capabilities to achieve more 
sources of revenues. This logic could not be a successful process of generating greater 
regional cohesion. 
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Considering this context, becomes really important a major revision of the 
intergovernmental regional transfers normative scheme in Uruguay in order to achieve 
to a more cohesion country. In this sense, we believe that the system intergovernmental 
transfers must rely on a stable, equitable and efficient allocation mechanism. 
Furthermore, if Uruguay intends to continue advancing in their decentralization process, 





Acemoglu D., Johnson S., Robinson J., 2005. Institutions as the fundamental cause of 
long-run growth. In: Aghion P, Durlauf, S (eds) Handbook of economic growth. 
Elsevier, Amsterdam, North Holland, 385-472. 
 
Alm, J., Boex, J., 2002. An Overview of Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations and 
Subnational Public Finance in Nigeria. ISP Working Paper Number 02-1. Andrew 
Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University. 
 
Alm J., Martinez-Vazquez, J., 2015. Re-designing equalization transfers: an application 
to south africa´s provincial equitable share. Journal of Developing Areas., Vol. 49 Issue 
1, 1-22. 
 
Amarante, V., Colafranceschi M., Vigorito A., 2011. Uruguay’s income inequality 
under right and left regimens over 1981 – 2010. Working Paper 94/11. WIDER. 
 
Arocena, J., 2008. Los desafíos de la descentralización y la participación ciudadana en 
el Uruguay, en Cuadernos para el Desarrollo Local. Diálogos por la Descentralización, 
Año 1, Nº1, pág. 17-34, PNUD, Programa ART Uruguay. 
 
Atlas, C.M., Gilligan, T., Hendershott R., Zupan M., 1995. Slicing the Federal 
Government Net Spending Pie: Who Wins, Loses, and Why American Economic 
Review 85(3), 624-629. 
 
Avery, R., 1977. Error components and seemingly unrelated regressions. Econometrica 
45, 199-209. 
 
Bahl, R., 1999. Implementation Rules for Fiscal Decentralization. ISP Working Paper 
Number 99-01. Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University. 
 
Baltagi, B., 1981. Simultaneous equations with error components. Journal of 
Econometrics 17, 189-200. 
 
Baltagi, B., 2008. Econometric Analysis of Panel Data, fourth ed. Wiley and Sons, 
Chichester. 
 
Bardhan, P., 2002. Decentralization of governance and development. Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 16 (4), 185–205. 
 
Bardhan P, Mookherjee, D., 2000. Capture and governance at local and national levels. 
American Economic Review 90(2), 135-139. 
 
Barro, R., 2000. Inequality and growth in a panel of countries. Journal of Economic 
Growth 5(1), 5-32. 
 
Barrenechea, P., Troncoso, C., 2008. El índice de competitividad regional. ¿Qué 
cambios tuvo la competitividad por departamentos en una década?, Programa de las 
Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo, Programa de Desarrollo Local ART Uruguay. 
 
 30 
Betson, D., Haveman, R., 1984. The Role of Income Transfers in Reducing Inequality 
between and within Regions.  Chapter in NBER book Economic Transfers in the United 
States. Marilyn Moon editor, 283-326. 
 
BID, 2007. Aportes para el Desarrollo del Sistema Financiero Municipal: El Papel de 
los Ingresos Propios Municipales. Estudio para los países del Cono Sur. País: Uruguay. 
Estudio preparado por: Daniel Sureda, Consultor - Coordinador del Proyecto: Huáscar 
Eguino. 
 
BID, 2009. Finanzas y gestión de los gobiernos subn-acionales en Uruguay. Nota 
Técnica UR-N1029 Responsable: Huáscar Eguino (FMM) Consultor: Juan Carlos 
Aguilar. 
 
Bjorn, E., Krishnakumar, J., 2008. Measurement errors and simultaneity, in: Mátyás, L., 
Sevestre, P. (Eds.), The Econometrics of Panel Data. Fundamentals and Recent 
Developments in Theory and Practice, Chapter 10, 323-367. 
 
Boex, J., 2003. The incidence of local government allocations in Tanzania, Public 
Administration and Development, 23(5). 
 
Brodjonegoro, B., Martinez-Vazquez, J., 2004. An Analysis of Indonesia's Transfer 
System:  Recent Performance and Future Prospects.  in Can Decentralization Help 
Rebuild Indonesia?  Eds. J. Alm, J. Martinez-Vazquez and Sri Muliani Indrawati. Edgar 
Elgar. 
 
Boex, J., Martinez-Vazquez, J., 2005. The Determinants of the Incidence of 
Intergovernmental Grants: A Survey of the International Experience. Andrew Young 
School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University Research Paper Series Working 
Paper 06-52. March. 
 
Böhme, K., 2009. The EU Territorial Agenda and its Action Programme: how to 
reinforce the performance. Stockholm: Sweco Eurofutures. 
 
Böhme K., Doucet, P., Komornicki, T., Zaucha, J., Światek, D., 2011. How to 
strengthen the territorial dimension of Europe 2020 and the EU Cohesion Policy 
(Report based on the Territorial Agenda 2020, prepared at the request of the Polish 
Presidency of the Council of the European Union). 
 
Brennan G., Buchanan, J., 1980. The power to tax. Analytical foundations of a fiscal 
constitution. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
 
Breton A., 1996. Competitive governments. An economic theory of politics and public 
finance. Cambridge University Press, New York. 
 
Brollo F., Nannicini, T., 2012. Tying Your Enemy's Hands in Close Races: The Politics 
of Federal Transfers in Brazil. American Political Science Review, 106, 742-761. 
 
Brosio, G., Jiménez, J., 2012. Introduction: approaching recent transform ations of 
intergovernm ental relations from multiple profiles in Decentralization and Reform in 
 31 
Latin America Improving Intergovernmental Relations. Edward Elgar Cheltenham, UK, 
Northampton, MA, USA. 
 
Buchanan, J., 1950. Federalism and fiscal equity. American Economic Review 40, 124–
138. 
 
Cameron, A., Trivedi, P., 2005. Microeconometrics: Methods and Applications. New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Cameron, A., Trivedi, P., 2010. Microeconometrics Using Stata. Rev. ed. College 
Station, TX: Stata Press. 
 
CEDES, 2010. Diseño institucional y descentralización territorial en un país unitario y 
centralizado como Uruguay. Informe Final. Agenda Nacional de Descentralización, 
Uruguay Integra, OPP. 
 
Cowell, F., 2000. Measurement of Inequality in Handbook of Income Distribution, 
edited by A.B. Atkinson and F. Bourguignon. Elsevier: Amsterdam. 
 
Cox, G., McCubbins, M., 1986. Electoral politics as a redistributive game. The Journal 
of Politics 48, 370–389. 
 
Curto-Grau, M., Solé-Ollé, A., Sorribas-Navarro, P., 2012. Partisan targeting of inter-
governmental transfers and state interference in local elections: evidence of Spain. 
Documents de Treball de l’IEB 2012/31. 
 
Dahlby, B., Wilson, L., 1994. Fiscal capacity, tax effort, and optimal equalization 
grants. Canadian Journal of Economics 337, 657–672. 
 
Dasgupta S., Dhillon, A., Dutta, B., 2004. Electoral Goals and Centre-State Transfers in 
India. University of Warwick Working Paper. 
 
Davidson R., MacKinnon, J., 2004. Econometric Theory and Methods. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Díaz-Cayeros, A., Magaloni, B., Estévez, F., 2007. Credit Claiming and Vote Buying? 
The Electoral Effects of Poverty Relief Programs in Mexico, Stanford University, 
mimeo. 
 
Dixit, A., Londregan, J., 1998. Fiscal federalism and redistributive politics. Journal of 
Public Economics 68, 153–180. 
 
Ezcurra R., Pascual, P., 2008. Fiscal decentralization and regional disparities: Evidence 
from several European Union countries. Environment and Planning A 40, pp. 1185-
1201. 
 
Ezcurra R., Rodríguez-Pose, A., 2014. Government quality and spatial inequality: A 
cross-country analysis. Environment and Planning A 46(7), 1732-1753. 
 
 32 
Greene, W., 2012. Econometric Analysis. 7th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice 
Hall. 
 
Grossman, P., 1994. A political theory of intergovernmental grants. Public Choice 78, 
295–303. 
 
Hayashi, F., 2000. Econometrics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
Keen M., Marchand, M., 1997. Fiscal competition and the pattern of public spending. 
Journal of Public Economics 66, 33–53. 
 
Khemani, S., 2003. Partisan Politics and Intergovernmental Transfers in India. Working 
Paper, vol. 3016. Development Research Group, The World Bank. 
 
Kmenta, J., 1997. Elements of Econometrics. Second Edition Annual Arbor: University 
of Michigan Press. 
 
Kyriacou A., Muinelo-Gallo L., Roca-Sagalés, O., 2015. Fiscal decentralization and 
regional disparities: The importance of good governance. Papers in Regional Science 94 
(1), 89 -107. 
 
Lessmann C., 2009. Fiscal decentralization and regional disparity: Evidence from cross 
section and panel data. Environment and Planning A 41, 2455-2473. 
 
Lessmann C., 2012. Regional inequality and decentralization: an empirical analysis. 
Environment and Plannning A 44, 1363-1388. 
 
Levitt, S., Snyder, J., 1995. Political parties and the distribution of federal outlays. 
American Journal of Political Science 39, 958–980. 
 
Limoneiro D., 2015. Beyond income transfers: The decline of regional inequality in 
Brazil during the 2000s. Progress in Development Studies. Jan2015, Vol. 15 Issue 1, 6-
21. 
 
Lindbeck, A., Weibull, J., 1987. Balanced budget redistribution as the outcome of 
political competition. Public Choice 52, 273–297. 
 
Martinez-Vazquez J., Mac Nab, R., 2003. Fiscal Decentralization and Economic 
Growth, World Development, Vol. 39(9), 1597-1661. 
 
Martinez-Vazquez, J., Sepulveda, C., 2011. Intergovernmental Transfers in Latin 
America: A Policy Reform Perspective, International Center for Public Policy Working 
Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper1108, International Center for Public Policy, 
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University. 
 
Martinez-Vazquez, J., Sepulveda, C., 2012. Toward a more general Intergovernmental 
transfers: a policy reform perspective 289 theory of revenue assignments, Working 
Paper, International Studies Program, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia 
State University, Atlanta, GA. 
 
 33 
Matyas, L., 1999. Generalized Method of Moments Estimation. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
McKinnon, R., 1997. Market-preserving fiscal federalism in the American monetary 
union, in Blejer M. and Ter-Minassian T. (eds) Macroeconomic dimensions of public 
finance: Essays in honour of Vito Tanzi, pp. 73-93. Routledge, London. 
 
Muinelo-Gallo, L., Rodríguez-Miranda, A., 2014. Descentralización fiscal, calidad de 
gestión de gobierno y disparidades regionales en Uruguay", Estudios de Economía, 
Vol.41, Nº2, 219-250. 
 
Musgrave, R., 1959. The Theory of Public Finance. McGraw-Hill, New York. 
 
Oates, W., 1972. Fiscal Federalism, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. 
 
Oates W., 1993. Fiscal decentralization and economic development. National Tax 
Journal 46(2), 237-243. 
 
Oates W., 1999. An essay on fiscal federalism. Journal Economic Literature 37, 1120-
1149. 
 
Porto, A., Sanguinetti, P., 2001. Political Determinants of Intergovernmental Grants: 
Evidence from Argentina. Economics and Politics 13(3), 237-256. 
 
Prud’homme, R., 1995. On the dangers of decentralization. World Bank Research 
Observer 10(2), 201-220. 
 
Qian, Y., Weingast, B., 1997. Federalism as a commitment to preserving market 
incentives. Journal of Economic Perspectives 11, 83-92. 
 
Raimondo, H., 1983. The Political Economy of State Intergovernmental Grants. Growth 
and Change 14,  17-23. 
 
Rodríguez-Miranda, A., 2006. Desarrollo Económico Territorial Endógeno. Teoría y 
aplicación al caso uruguayo, Serie Documentos de Trabajo, DT 2/06, Instituto de 
Economía, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Administración, Universidad de la 
República. 
 
Rodríguez-Miranda, A., 2014. Desarrollo económico y disparidades territoriales en 
Uruguay. Cuadernos sobre Desarrollo Humano Nº 3, PNUD Uruguay. 
 
Rodríguez-Pose, A., 2010. Do institutions matter for regional development in the EU? 
Imdea Working Paper series in Economics and Social Sciences 2010/2, Madrid. 
  
Rodríguez-Pose A., Ezcurra, R., 2010. Does decentralization matter for regional 
disparities? A cross-country analysis. Journal of Economic Geography 10, 619-644. 
 
Rodrik D, Subramanian, F., Trebbi, F., 2004. Institutions rule: The primacy of 
institutions over geography and integration in economic development. Journal of 
Economic Growth 9, 131-65. 
 34 
 
Sacchi A., Salotti, S., 2014. How regional inequality affects fiscal decentralisation: 
accounting for the autonomy of subcentral governments. Environment and Planning C: 
Government and Policy 32(1), 144 – 162. 
 
Salmon P., 1987. Decentralization as an incentive scheme. Oxford Review of Economic 
Policy 3(2), 24-43. 
 
Sollé-Ollé, A., Sorribas-Navarro, P., 2008. The effects of partisan alignment on the 
allocation of intergovernmental transfers. Differences-in-differences estimates for 
Spain. Journal of Public Economics 92 812), 2302–2319. 
 
Tabellini, G., 2010. Culture and institutions: Economic development in the regions of 
Europe. Journal of the European Economic Association 8(4), 677-716. 
 
Theil, H., 1971. Principles of Econometrics. New York: Wiley. 
 
Weingast B., 1995. The economic role of political institutions: Market-preserving 
federalism and economic development. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 
11, 1-31. 
 
Williamson, J., 1965. Regional inequality and the process of national development: A 
description of patterns. Economic Development and Cultural Change 13, 3-45. 
 
Wooldridge, J., 2010. Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. Second 
Edition. MIT Press. 
 
Worthington, A., Dollery, B., 1998. The political determination of intergovernmental 
grants in Australia. Public Choice 94, 299–315. 
 
Zellner, A., Theil, H., 1962. Three-stage least squares: simultaneous estimation of 
simultaneous equations”. Econometrica 30(1), 54–78. 
 
Acknowledgements 
The authors would like to thank the financial support from the project “I+D 2014” of 
the “Comisión Sectorial de Investigación Científica – Universidad de la República – 























Table A. 2 - Departments (regions) 
Artigas, Canelones, Cerro Largo, Colonia, Durazno, Flores, Florida, Lavalleja, 
Maldonado, Paysandú, Salto, San José, Soriano, Río Negro, Rivera, Rocha, 
Tacuarembó, Treinta y Tres, Montevideo (reference department). 
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Table A.3 Data definitions and sources 





Coefficient of variation, calculated with average per capita 





























Region GDP per 
cápita 
 





Presidency of the 
Republic 
 
Political Alignment Dummy  variable that takes the value 1 if the political party of 
RG department at time t is the same as the political party that 
governs the central state and 0 otherwise 
Electoral Court 
of the República 
Oriental del 
Uruguay 
Region Population Department  population (in thousands) Continuous 
Household 




























Variable Definition Source 
Fiscal 
Decentralization 

































Percentage of department labour force that is unemployed but 












Percentage of the department population,   
both employed and unemployed, that constitutes 
the manpower supply of the labour market, regardless of their 












Categorical variable that takes values 0, 1 and 2. The value 0 
is assigned to departments that show a low potential for 
regional development, in practical terms is defined as 
persistently departments that in the period 1990-2012 are 
shown worst positioned relative to national average GDP per 
capita. A value of 1 is assigned to departments that hold 
intermediate positions in the national context. The value 2 is 
assigned to departments that persistently show the best 
indicators in the national context and, therefore, are at the top 
of the ranking between Uruguayan departments 
 







Categorical variable takes values from 0 (nearest to 











Table A.4 - Summary statistics 
 Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum Observations 












N = 396 
n = 18 
T = 23 
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N = 396 
n = 18 
T = 23 












N = 396 
n = 18 
T = 23 
Log of Regional government 













N = 396 
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N = 396 
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N = 396 
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N = 396 
n = 18 
T = 23 
Activity rate Overall 
Between 
Within 
11.4022   11.4022   
2.9647 







N = 396 
n = 18 
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Table A.5 - Composition of departmental revenues, selected years 
(% of national GDP) 
 Own revenues Intergovermental transfers Total revenues 
 1990 2000 2005 2012 1990 2000 2005 2012 1990 2000 2005 2012 
Artigas 0,034 0,033 0,032 0,026 0,045 0,020 0,035 0,048 0,079 0,052 0,067 0,074 
Canelones 0,162 0,290 0,250 0,207 0,043 0,063 0,123 0,104 0,205 0,353 0,373 0,311 
Cerro Largo 0,017 0,024 0,023 0,021 0,037 0,034 0,065 0,056 0,054 0,058 0,088 0,077 
Colonia 0,043 0,077 0,066 0,074 0,032 0,035 0,049 0,044 0,075 0,112 0,115 0,118 
Durazno 0,017 0,030 0,027 0,027 0,040 0,031 0,060 0,048 0,057 0,061 0,087 0,075 
Flores 0,010 0,021 0,021 0,022 0,019 0,017 0,029 0,026 0,029 0,038 0,050 0,048 
Florida 0,018 0,031 0,030 0,020 0,030 0,036 0,045 0,040 0,048 0,067 0,075 0,060 
Lavalleja 0,022 0,036 0,032 0,024 0,030 0,027 0,044 0,045 0,052 0,063 0,076 0,069 
Maldonado 0,199 0,328 0,320 0,282 0,036 0,048 0,080 0,068 0,235 0,376 0,400 0,350 
Paysandú 0,047 0,050 0,042 0,040 0,039 0,048 0,063 0,058 0,086 0,098 0,105 0,098 
Rio Negro 0,021 0,027 0,023 0,018 0,039 0,030 0,040 0,047 0,060 0,057 0,063 0,065 
Rivera 0,046 0,035 0,031 0,034 0,034 0,027 0,051 0,043 0,080 0,062 0,082 0,077 
Rocha 0,031 0,065 0,055 0,057 0,033 0,034 0,042 0,050 0,064 0,099 0,097 0,107 
Salto 0,067 0,070 0,063 0,057 0,036 0,047 0,062 0,062 0,103 0,117 0,125 0,119 
San José 0,028 0,038 0,049 0,040 0,031 0,026 0,046 0,043 0,059 0,064 0,095 0,083 
Soriano 0,040 0,037 0,028 0,030 0,066 0,041 0,053 0,050 0,106 0,078 0,081 0,080 
Tacuarembó 0,035 0,048 0,038 0,030 0,044 0,037 0,056 0,052 0,079 0,085 0,094 0,082 




0,856 1,263 1,152 1,024 0,657 0,623 0,955 0,925 1,513 1,885 2,107 1,949 






Table A.6 – Composition of departmental revenues, selected years 
(% of departmental total revenues) 
 Own revenues Intergovermental tranfers 
 1990 2000 2005 2012 1990 2000 2005 2012 
Artigas 48,9 62,3 78,6 34,7 51,1 37,7 21,4 65,3 
Canelones 79,2 82,0 67,0 66,6 20,8 18,0 33,0 33,4 
Cerro Largo 32,3 40,9 26,0 27,2 67,7 59,1 74,0 72,8 
Colonia 57,3 68,8 57,3 62,9 42,7 31,2 42,7 26,1 
Durazno 29,7 48,7 31,5 36,3 70,3 51,3 68,5 63,7 
Flores 35,4 54,4 42,3 46,6 64,6 45,6 57,7 53,4 
Florida 36,6 46,9 39,9 32,7 63,4 53,1 60,1 57,3 
Lavalleja 42,3 57,7 42,2 34,7 57,7 42,3 57,8 65,3 
Maldonado 84,7 87,3 79,8 80,6 15,3 12,7 10,2 9,4 
Paysandú 54,6 50,9 40,1 40,7 45,4 49,1 59,9 59,3 
Rio Negro 35,3 47,3 36,6 27,2 64,7 52,7 63,4 72,8 
Rivera 57,1 56,3 37,9 43,7 42,9 43,7 62,1 56,3 
Rocha 48,4 65,5 57,0 53,3 51,6 34,5 43,0 46,7 
Salto 65,2 59,5 50,2 48,0 34,8 40,5 49,8 52,0 
San José 47,2 59,2 51,9 48,7 52,8 40,8 48,1 51,3 
Soriano 37,5 47,5 34,2 37,1 62,5 52,5 65,8 62,9 
Tacuarembó 44,2 56,7 40,8 36,5 55,8 43,3 59,2 63,5 
Treinta y Tres 45,4 51,2 35,9 26,1 54,6 48,8 64,1 73,9 
Source: Office of Planning and Budget - Presidency of the Republic 
 
